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I. INTRODUCTION
In real estate transactions, escrows are often used to help facilitate
the deal and provide piece of mind to the parties involved. In the typi-
cal escrow arrangement, the seller agrees to place the deed and other
documents related to title of the property with a disinterested third
party who serves as the escrow holder or agent.' The buyer similarly
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Leigh M. Koehn, B.S. 2002, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. expected May
2006, University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive
Editor, 2005-2006). Special thanks to my husband, Aaron Koehn, and my
parents, Loren and Dianne Havekost, for their unending love and support.
1. Charles H. Walker & William D. Eshee, Jr., The Safeguards and Dilemmas of
Escrows, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 45, 45 (1987).
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deposits all or a portion of the purchase price with the escrow agent.
These items are held in escrow until the conditions set out by the two
parties in the escrow agreement are met.2 Upon occurrence of the
stated conditions, the escrow agent delivers the deeds or documents to
the buyer and the money to the seller, thus completing the
transaction.
3
The use of an escrow is beneficial in these transactions because it
protects both parties-neither is left vulnerable to fraudulent acts by
the other. The escrow holder essentially acts as a safeguard during
the transitional period when the ownership of the property is in limbo.
Unfortunately, both parties are still exposed to the possibility of
fraudulent or negligent behavior on the part of the escrow agent who
is supposed to be protecting them. One potential problem of the es-
crow arrangement is that the escrow holder will take advantage of the
position of trust in which he has been placed and embezzle the money
under his custody.4
Determining which party should bear the loss when the funds are
embezzled by the escrow holder is often a difficult and troublesome
task. The one who is responsible for the hardship has typically either
disappeared or become insolvent, so the two parties to the transaction
are left to battle between themselves over the missing funds. An equi-
table remedy seems impossible in such a situation as both parties are
generally innocent of any wrongdoing.5 The inevitable result is that
one blameless party will suffer a substantial loss while the other will
still reap the benefits of the deal.6
This unfortunate situation is exactly where the parties in Bio-Elec-
tronics v. C & J Partnership7 found themselves. In deciding this case,
the Nebraska Supreme Court backed away from the previous escrow
embezzlement jurisprudence where the purchaser alone had to bear
the risk of loss. Instead, the court focused its analysis solely on a tech-
nicality of the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), with
2. Id.
3. Id. at 45-46.
4. See Robert L. Flores, A Comparison of the Rules and Rationales for Allocating
Risks Arising in Realty Sales Using Executory Sales Contracts and Escrows, 59
Mo. L. REV. 307, 307 (1994).
5. The decision becomes easier in cases where one of the parties to the transaction
has some level of culpability for the loss (i.e., committing an act that is greater
than mere delay), that allows the embezzlement to take place. See, e.g., Majors v.
Butler, 221 P.2d 994 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Jones v. Lally, 511 So. 2d 1014
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
6. One trial court did attempt to split the loss between the buyer and seller, but that
decision was overturned in favor of a rule allocating the loss to the legal owner of
the embezzled funds. See Cradock v. Cooper, 123 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
7. 268 Neb. 252, 682 N.W.2d 248 (2004).
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almost no reference to the way loss allocation has historically been
applied.8
Part II of this Note explores the development of the rules behind
allocation of risk in an escrow transaction, focusing in particular on
two cases that had significant roles in establishing these rules. Next,
the factual background of Bio-Electronics is discussed in detail in Part
III. In Part IV, this Note discusses the implications of the court's
holding in relation to the theories of ownership and agency in loss allo-
cation, suggesting that this decision seems to put these two theories at
odds in the rare situation like the one involved in Bio-Electronics. In
addition, this Note addresses the underlying policy considerations
that, although not discussed by the court, may have been at the heart
of the holding. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that because of
the unusual facts of this case and its somewhat anomalous result, the
court's holding should and will be narrowly limited in its application
to future cases.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Entitlement Rule: Ownership and
Agency
Every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue of escrow loss has
turned to what has been referred to as the "entitlement rule" in decid-
ing which party must bear the loss.9 This rule has generally been
credited to two separate but similar California cases: Hildebrand v.
Becklo and Shreeves v. Pearson.l' While both cases arose out of the
misconduct of the same escrow agent, the California Supreme Court
based its findings for these cases from two somewhat different theo-
ries of liability.12
In Shreeves, the first of the two cases, the seller and buyers entered
into an agreement for the sale of real property. The transaction was to
take place through an escrow, conditioned upon the seller's ability to
deliver a valid deed to the property and to prove that she had an unen-
cumbered title.13 During the period before all the conditions were
met, the parties agreed that the buyers would take immediate posses-
sion of the house prior to the close of the escrow, and in consideration,
the seller would be paid a portion of the funds held in escrow. 14 The
8. Id. at 257-58, 682 N.W.2d at 252-53.
9. Flores, supra note 4, at 309.
10. 236 P. 301 (Cal. 1925).
11. 230 P. 448 (Cal. 1924).
12. Flores, supra note 4, at 351-52; see also H.D. Warren, Annotation, Who Must
Bear Loss Resulting from Defaults or Peculations of Escrow Holder, 15 A.L.R.2D
870 (1951).
13. Shreeves, 230 P. at 448.
14. Id. at 450.
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seller was issued a check from the escrow company, which was re-
turned unpaid, and the escrow agent subsequently disappeared with
the funds.15
The seller prevailed in an action to regain possession of the prem-
ises. The court based its holding on the theory of agency, stating that
the escrow holder is the agent of the buyer with respect to the money,
and the agent of the seller with respect to the deed or other docu-
ments. The escrow holder's role does not change until each party has
become completely entitled to the item that is to be transferred to him
under the agreement.16 Before all the conditions precedent to the ex-
change have been met with respect to the money in escrow, the escrow
holder remains the agent of the buyer or the depositor.i 7 In Shreeves,
all the conditions of the escrow had not been met at the time of the
embezzlement, and as a result, the buyers had to bear the loss caused
by their agent.' 8
In Hildebrand, the court employed a different theory to reach the
same conclusion that the buyer must bear the risk that his funds will
be embezzled before the time to complete the transaction has arrived.
The facts were substantially similar to those of the Shreeves case: the
buyer of property deposited the purchase price in escrow, which was
then embezzled before the title to the property could be guaranteed as
required by the terms of the agreement.19 This time, the California
Supreme Court focused not on the relationship of the escrow agent to
each party, but instead on the ownership of the funds.20 The court
determined that because the money was embezzled before all the con-
ditions of the exchange had been satisfied, it remained under the own-
ership of the buyer and was therefore the buyer's money to lose.2 i
These two theories both lead to the rule that the "wrong of an es-
crow holder, must, as between the parties to the escrow transaction,
be borne by the one who, at the time of its occurrence, was lawfully
entitled to the right or property affected." 2 2 However, while both theo-
ries lead to the same conclusion, most jurisdictions seem to address
the issue in terms of ownership, as in Hildebrand, instead of using the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 451.
17. Id.; see also, e.g., Lieb v. Webster, 190 P.2d 701 (Wash. 1948) (holding that where
the condition that a title insurance policy be delivered to the buyer was not met,
the escrow agent remained the agent of the buyer).
18. Shreeves, 230 P. at 453.
19. Hildebrand v. Beck, 236 P. 301, 303 (Cal. 1925).
20. See Flores, supra note 4, at 352.
21. Id.
22. Warren, supra note 12, at 87; see also Flores, supra note 4, at 352.
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agency terminology of Shreeves.2 3 Nebraska follows the general rule
that "if an escrow agent 'embezzles the funds before the time has come
to release them, he has embezzled the funds of the depositor."
24 This
language is also more in line with the allocation of risk based on own-
ership; however, Nebraska has referred to the agency theory as well in
escrow cases.
25
B. Equitable Considerations in Risk Allocation
One final consideration in allocating loss is the rule that "when one
of two innocent parties must suffer, the one [who] made the occur-
rence of the event possible must suffer, rather than the one who is
entirely without blame."2 6 This general rule of law has been applied
in escrow cases where the acts or omissions of one party allowed the
escrow agent an opportunity to commit the fraud.27 It can be used as
an equitable "trump card" to hold one party liable for the embezzled
funds, even if he was not the owner of the funds and the escrow holder
was not acting as his agent. For example, in another case from Cali-
fornia, Majors v. Butler,28 the sellers failed to furnish documents suffi-
cient to show good title as required by their escrow agreement. The
court held that they acted negligently in not complying with the allot-
ted time limit for producing the proper documentation, thus extending
the period of risk accompanying the escrow. 2 9 Although ownership of
the funds had not yet changed hands, the court reasoned that the sell-
ers should be held responsible for the loss because they allowed it to
occur, rather than imposing the loss on the blameless buyer.
30
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellees in the present case, C & J Partnership, Krieger Fam-
ily Children's Trust, Chuck Uribe, John Daubert, and Albert Pepler
23. Flores, supra note 4, at 352; see, e.g., Bixby Ranch Co. v. United States, 35 Fed.
Cl. 674 (1996); Cradock v. Cooper, 123 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Za-
remba v. Konopka, 228 A.2d 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
24. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, 268 Neb. 252, 257, 682 N.W.2d 248, 252
(2004); see also 28 AM. JUR. 2D Escrow § 31 (2000).
25. See Rehmeyer v. Lysinger, 109 Neb. 805, 809-10, 192 N.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1923).
26. ScottsbluffNat'l Bank v. Blue J. Feeds, Inc., 156 Neb. 65, 83, 54 N.W.2d 392, 403
(1952); see also VRT, Inc. v. Dutton-Lainson Co., 247 Neb. 845, 851, 530 N.W.2d
619, 623-24 (1995); Rehmeyer, 109 Neb. at 811-12, 192 N.W. at 339-40.
27. See, e.g., Majors v. Butler, 221 P.2d 994 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Jones v. Lally,
511 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the sellers were the
least innocent in a transaction for the sale of their house because they failed to
properly endorse the buyer's check, giving the escrow agent an opportunity to
stop payment on the check and abscond with the funds).
28. 221 P.2d 994 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)
29. Id. at 997-98.
30. Id. at 998.
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(collectively "C & J Partnership"), were the owners of the real estate in
dispute. 31 For over fifteen years, they had leased the property to the
appellant, Nebraska Hospital Association Charitable, Scientific, and
Educational Foundation, doing business as Bio-Electronics ("Bio-
Electronics"). 32
On November 9, 2001, Bio-Electronics offered to purchase the
property that had been the subject of the lease. 33 Their offer of
$152,870 was accepted by C & J Partnership on November 13, 2001.34
The closing was scheduled for December 20, 2001, at the offices of the
designated title agent, State Title Services, Inc. ("State Title").35
The parties intended to close the sale by a simultaneous exchange
of the deed for the purchase price.3 6 At the closing, Bio-Electronics
delivered a cashier's check for the full amount of the agreed purchase
price, made payable to C & J Partnership.37 The check was then en-
dorsed on behalf of C & J Partnership by one of its partners, Chuck
Uribe.38 However, the exchange could not be completed at that time
because another partner, Albert Pepler, had not yet signed the war-
ranty deed.39
At this point, the details of what occurred at the closing become a
bit fuzzy. Because the warranty deed was not fully executed, the ex-
change had to be delayed. The cashier's check was consequently
placed in escrow with State Title pending completion of the warranty
deed.40 It is unclear whether the partially executed warranty deed
was held in escrow as well, or if it was simply left at State Title's of-
fice.4 1 There was also much dispute over whether it was Bio-Electron-
ics or C & J Partnership who actually requested that the funds be
placed in escrow. It was apparently Uribe's understanding that "he
signed the back of the cashier's check on behalf of C & J Partnership
in order to allow Bio-Electronics to deposit the proceeds in escrow with
State Title."42 Bio-Electronics, on the other hand, contended that "C




34. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, No. CI02-568, Order at 2 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2002).
35. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 253, 682 N.W.2d at 250.
36. Id. at 254-55, 682 N.W.2d at 251.
37. Id. at 253, 682 N.W.2d at 250.
38. Id. at 253-54, 682 N.W.2d at 250.
39. Id. at 254, 682 N.W.2d at 250.





& J Partnership... indors fed] the check and deposit [ed] it with State
Title."4
3
After the scheduled closing, C & J Partnership and State Title
were in contact in regards to obtaining the missing signature. On
January 22, 2002, a copy of the warranty deed was sent to Pepler, who
received it on January 23, 2002.44 However, the same day the deed
was sent, the president of State Title committed suicide amid allega-
tions of embezzlement.45 On January 28, 2002, before the warranty
deed was signed and executed, State Title filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7.46 Among the funds that had been embezzled were the
$152,870 that had been intended for the purchase of property by Bio-
Electronics.
47
Bio-Electronics filed a petition for specific performance of the con-
tract, contending that it had fully performed under the purchase
agreement and requesting that C & J Partnership convey the war-
ranty deed with clear title.48 C & J Partnership moved for summary
judgment, arguing conversely that Bio-Electronics had not performed
under the agreement because the money was embezzled before it
could be delivered.49 The district court held that ownership of the
funds had not passed from Bio-Electronics to C & J Partnership be-
cause the condition that would allow them to be released to the seller's
control had not yet occurred.So The court also determined that State
Title served as Bio-Electronics' agent to protect its funds.51 The court
did address the fact that were it not for C & J Partnership's failure to
deliver a fully executed warranty deed, the embezzlement would not
have occurred. However, it concluded that the delay was not unrea-
sonable because time is not of the essence in the ordinary sale of real
estate.52 Based on these findings, the district court granted C & J
Partnership's motion for summary judgment.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court relied on the Nebraska U.C.C. in its finding that ownership of
the funds had indeed passed from Bio-Electronics to C & J Partner-
ship.53 The court looked to the provisions on the transfer and enforce-
43. Brief of Appellant at 12, Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. 252, 682 N.W.2d 248 (No. S-03-
068) [hereinafter Appellant Brief].
44. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, No. CI02-568, Order at 7 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2002).
45. Id. at 2.
46. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 254, 682 N.W.2d at 250.
47. Id.
48. Id., 682 N.W.2d at 251.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 255, 682 N.W.2d at 251.
51. Id.
52. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, No. C102-568, Order at 8 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2002).
53. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 257, 682 N.W.2d at 253.
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ment of negotiable instruments to determine that C & J Partnership
became the holder in due course of the cashier's check when Uribe
took possession of the check. This possession was further evidenced
by Uribe's endorsement of the check. 54 The court unanimously deter-
mined that because C & J Partnership was technically the owner of
the funds at the time they were embezzled, it should bear the loss,
without any elaboration on the general rules of risk allocation.
55
IV. ANALYSIS
The Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in Bio-Electronics is con-
sistent with the theory that the owner or depositor of the funds held in
escrow bears the risk of loss. However, the court relied heavily on the
technical aspects of negotiable instruments without truly addressing
some of C & J Partnership's arguments on the transfer of ownership
through escrow. In addition, it is difficult to reconcile this decision
with the theory that the escrow holder was acting as the agent of the
depositor. In this case, it seems that the two theories behind the enti-
tlement rule would have led to different results. This inconsistency
indicates that perhaps there were more policy considerations behind
this decision than the court revealed in its brief opinion.
A. Ownership Theory
Bio-Electronics demonstrates how critical timing is in determining
when ownership of the items being exchanged has been transferred. C
& J Partnership argued that the funds could not have been trans-
ferred until a fully-executed warranty deed was delivered as this was
an essential condition of the sale.56 This argument was evidently
based on the typical escrow arrangement where the buyer places the
money in escrow in order to protect it from being taken before the time
when all the conditions of the closing can be met.5 7 Under the normal
circumstances stated above, C & J Partnership would have been cor-
rect in arguing that because all the conditions of the escrow had not
been fulfilled, ownership of the funds had not been shifted. The facts
of this case did not fit within the typical escrow arrangement, how-
ever. In this case, the result was based on the fact that ownership of
the funds changed hands not through the escrow, but before it.58
The flaw in C & J Partnership's argument was that it failed to rec-
ognize that the conditions required under the escrow agreement were
54. Id. at 257-58, 682 N.W.2d at 253; see NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 3-102 to -105, -201, -301
to -302 (Reissue 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2004 & Supp. 2005).
55. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 258, 682 N.W.2d at 253.
56. Brief of Appellee at 9, Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. 252, 682 N.W.2d 248 (No. S-03-
068) [hereinafter Appellee Briefl.
57. See Walker & Eshee, supra note 1, at 45.
58. Appellant Brief, supra note 43, at 13.
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separate from those required to transfer possession of the funds before
the escrow agreement was formed. C & J Partnership approached the
argument as if the condition that the warranty deed be delivered was
applied directly to the cashier's check. 59 In reality, no condition was
applied to the transfer of the cashier's check from Bio-Electronics to C
& J Partnership; the court found that the simple act of delivering it
was sufficient to transfer possession. 60 Delivery of the warranty deed
was only necessary to release the funds after they had been placed in
escrow by C & J Partnership.
The court used a straightforward application of the Nebraska
U.C.C. in its determination that C & J Partnership was the legal
owner of the funds before they were placed in escrow.6 1 Because C &
J Partnership was the owner of the money prior to the placement of
the funds in escrow, it was also considered to be the depositor. As the
legal owner and depositor of the embezzled funds, C & J Partnership
was correctly made to bear the loss under the ownership theory. How-
ever, the court should have specifically addressed why C & J Partner-
ship's argument was not effective, rather than relying solely on the
provisions of the Nebraska U.C.C. Due to the fact that ownership was
transferred before the escrow even existed, the conditions placed on
the escrow arrangement became irrelevant.
B. Agency Theory
The district court also addressed the issue of agency in its decision
in favor of C & J Partnership, but the Nebraska Supreme Court made
no mention of this theory in reversing the lower court. 62 One might
wonder why the court would fail to even acknowledge one of the losing
side's most arguable points. Perhaps the reason the court chose not to
take up this issue is that it would most likely have led to the exact
opposite conclusion that was reached by employing the ownership
theory.
This case presented the unusual situation in which the seller was
found to be the depositor of the funds.63 However, this is contrary to
the purpose for using an escrow in the first place. As mentioned previ-
ously, in the typical escrow agreement, the funds are placed in escrow
by the buyer to ensure that his money is protected while he is waiting
for the seller to complete his end of the bargain. 64 The escrow holder
59. Appellee Brief, supra note 56, at 18.
60. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 257-58, 682 N.W.2d at 253.
61. Id., 682 N.W.2d at 252-53; see supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
62. See Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 257-58, 682 N.W.2d at 252-53.
63. Id. at 258, 682 N.W.2d at 253.
64. See Walker & Eshee, supra note 1, at 45.
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is certainly acting as the buyer's agent in such a case. 6 5 Here, the
seller, C & J Partnership, was technically the legal owner of the funds
at the time they were placed in escrow. So why would the funds have
been placed in escrow at all if the only logical reason for doing so
would have been to protect them from being prematurely taken by C &
J Partnership? Surely the escrow holder was not acting as C & J Part-
nership's agent to protect it from itself. And surely, as the owner of
the funds, C & J Partnership had every right to take the cashier's
check immediately if it so chose.
One can only speculate then, as to why an escrow was in fact used.
C & J Partnership stated that the "funds were held in escrow for the
protection and convenience of Bio-Electronics until C & J Partnership
executed and delivered a warranty deed."66 Bio-Electronics main-
tained that because of the long relationship between the two parties, it
did not insist on using an escrow.6 7 One possible explanation for why
the funds ended up in escrow is that, because C & J Partnership failed
to uphold its end of the bargain from the beginning and because of the
long history between the two parties, it wanted to prove its trustwor-
thiness by choosing not to take Bio-Electronics' money until it could
deliver something in return.68 No matter what the reasoning, the
agency theory does not seem to fit very well into these facts. The es-
tablished law seems to provide no answer to the question of whose
agent the escrow holder is when the party supposedly being protected
is not the owner of the funds.69
Maybe the court did not address the agency theory because it just
did not make sense to rely on it under this set of facts. On the other
hand, the court's holding could be read as indicating that only the
ownership theory is to be used in Nebraska, which would be a much
more significant statement. The court should have made clear the
reason for completely omitting the agency theory from its decision.
Since it did not do so, this decision may cause some confusion for the
future of real estate transactions. Now, rather than relying on the
proposition that the escrow holder generally acts as the agent of the
buyer with respect to his money,70 the seller in escrow transactions
65. Some authorities have held that the depositary is always the agent of the pur-
chaser. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Escrow § 20 (2000); see, e.g., Angell v. Ingram, 213 P.2d
944 (Wash. 1950).
66. Appellee Brief, supra note 56, at 9.
67. Bio-Electronics, 268 Neb. at 255, 682 N.W.2d at 251.
68. In the normal arm's length transaction between strangers, it is generally in each
party's best interest to insist on an escrow arrangement. Here, the confusion
over the escrow was caused in part by the relationship between the parties and
the fact that C & J Partnership may have been more concerned than usual about
protecting the buyer's interest, while Bio-Electronics was less concerned than
usual that it would be defrauded by the seller.
69. See 28 AM. JuR. 2D Escrow § 20 (2000).
70. See Walker & Eshee, supra note 1, at 45.
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should be certain that he does not prematurely accept ownership of
property and the liabilities that go along with it.
C. The Least Innocent Bears the Loss
Lurking behind the dispute over who owned the funds and on
whose behalf the agent was supposed to be acting was the issue of
which party was more to blame for the loss (other than the agent him-
self). One of the reasons the roles of the parties in this transaction
were so confused was that they had not originally intended to use an
escrow. If C & J Partnership had delivered a fully-executed warranty
at the scheduled closing as planned, the escrow agent would never
have had an opportunity to embezzle the funds.71 Instead, the money
was placed in escrow to be kept until the sale could be completed, set-
ting in motion the events that led to this dispute.
1. The District Court Opinion
One of the issues discussed by the trial court, but again omitted by
the Nebraska Supreme Court, was Bio-Electronics' argument that be-
cause C & J Partnership's delay allowed the escrow agent the opportu-
nity to embezzle the funds, the seller should be held responsible.72
The district court, of course, only needed to address this question be-
cause it found that C & J Partnership did not own the money at the
time it was embezzled, and in order to hold C & J Partnership liable,
an exception to the general rules of loss allocation must have ap-
plied. 7 3 Since the Nebraska Supreme Court held that C & J Partner-
ship did in fact own the funds, it did not need to rely on the argument
that the least innocent of the parties should bear the risk. The issue is
still worth examining though, because, in this Author's opinion, it
sheds some light on what may have been one of the driving forces be-
hind the court's final decision, even if not outwardly discussed. As the
trial court noted, "the rule that as between two innocent parties the
loss should fall upon the one who made the loss possible protects only
those who exercise ordinary care and caution in performance of
duty."74 The court could have determined that, under this exception,
Bio-Electronics should have been protected, as it did everything re-
quired of it under the purchase agreement. However, the court found
that C & J Partnership was not made responsible by its delay because
the delay was not unreasonable. 7 5 The court noted that in the ordi-
nary real estate transaction, time is not of the essence unless specifi-
71. Appellant Brief, supra note 43, at 15-16.
72. Id.
73. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, No. CI02-568, Order at 6 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2002).
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 8.
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cally included in the agreement. 76 The court further explained that
when both parties have used ordinary care, the decision rests again on
the theories of ownership and agency.
7 7
It does seem that Bio-Electronics had a valid argument under the
theory that the least innocent of two parties who have been made to
suffer by the acts of a third should be the one to bear the loss. The
embezzlement of funds was occasioned solely by C & J Partnership's
failure to bring a fully-executed warranty deed to the scheduled clos-
ing and the fact that another month passed before a serious attempt
at obtaining the missing signature was made.78 However, the district
court found that these faults were not serious enough to allow an equi-
table remedy to interfere with the general rules of loss allocation.
Nevertheless, there was still the feeling that Bio-Electronics was be-
ing punished for C & J Partnership's mistake, and the theory that the
more innocent party should be protected was not quite strong enough
to provide Bio-Electronics any relief.
2. The Possible Role of the Least Innocent Theory in the
Nebraska Supreme Court's Decision
Perhaps part of the reason the Nebraska Supreme Court hung its
decision so heavily on a technicality, is that it was simply a stronger
hook. There would have been much more room for debate if the court
had based its decision on the fact that C & J Partnership was the least
innocent of the two parties. Whether or not C & J Partnership acted
negligently or unreasonably in its failure to produce the necessary
warranty deed seemed to be a very close call. By basing the decision
instead on the Nebraska U.C.C. and the ownership theory, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court handed down a decision that was more author-
itative, and also in line with the underlying equitable considerations.
Because more importance is generally placed on ownership as a
basis for allocation of loss, 79 a finding that funds definitively belonged
to one party and not the other is more irrefutable than a weak argu-
ment based on the least innocent principle. In this way, the court was
able to reach what seems to be the more "just" result without turning
to the equitable principle that the least innocent party should bear the
76. Id. at 7; cf Majors v. Butler, 221 P.2d 994 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that
a seller's failure to obtain a proper warranty deed was negligent when the escrow
agreement required that the deed be delivered within thirty days).
77. Bio-Electronics v. C & J Partnership, No. CI02-568, Order at 7 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2002).
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
79. Flores, supra note 4, at 352 ("Most [states] turn to the ownership terminology of
Hildebrand .... Treatises seem to favor the ownership theory, and that is the
position of the Restatement (Second) of Agency .. ").
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risk of loss, a principle that most likely would not have yielded the
more equitable result.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court reached the correct decision in rul-
ing that under the unusual set of circumstances involved in Bio-Elec-
tronics, the buyer of the property should not have been made to bear
the loss of funds embezzled from the escrow account in which they
were held. In reaching this conclusion, the court properly applied the
Nebraska U.C.C. to the facts of the transaction: Bio-Electronics trans-
ferred ownership of the funds to C & J Partnership prior to their
placement in escrow. Thus, as the owner and depositor of the funds,
the seller, C & J Partnership, had to bear the burden. The court's
decision, however, rested solely on a technicality without elaboration
on any of the theories or policies generally employed in resolving dis-
putes over embezzled escrow funds.
The court leaned heavily on the theory that the owner or depositor
of the funds held in escrow should be made to bear the burden of the
loss.8 0 In so deciding, the court ignored the conflict its decision cre-
ated between the ownership theory and its counterpart involving
agency.8 1 In the usual case, the buyer maintains ownership of his
money when it is deposited into escrow. The escrow holder accord-
ingly acts as the buyer's agent, protecting his funds until the seller
has delivered on his end of the bargain. The result under these cir-
cumstances would be the same no matter which theory was used. The
buyer would bear the loss as the owner of the funds, or as the principal
of the agent who embezzled them. In virtually all standard escrow
cases, the theories of ownership and agency act in harmony, leading to
one rule that the party who is entitled to the funds at the time of their
embezzlement must bear the loss.8 2
In the instant case, under the ownership theory, the seller was
forced to bear the loss, whereas under the agency theory, it seems
more likely that the buyer would have had to bear the loss as the
party who was to be protected by the escrow holder. Because of this
inconsistency, it appears that the agency theory was sacrificed to the
more prevalent ownership theory. Yet upon closer inspection, one
may infer that there was something else going on beneath the court's
one-dimensional reasoning. Perhaps at the foundation of the court's
decision was the general principle that "where one of two innocent
parties must suffer by the acts of a third, he whose conduct, act, or
omission enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain
80. Hildebrand v. Beck, 236 P. 301, 303-04 (Cal. 1925).
81. Shreeves v. Pearson, 230 P. 448, 453 (Cal. 1924).
82. Flores, supra note 4, at 352.
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it."s3 This possibility suggests that the court decided that the "just"
result in this case would be to protect the party who was the most
innocent, then crafted a legal argument to support the desired out-
come based on a stronger theory. If, alternatively, the court really in-
tended to disregard the agency theory in favor of loss allocation based
on ownership, it should have explained more clearly the rationale be-
hind its decision, rather than simply ignoring valid agency arguments
and taking a purely mechanical approach.
While the court's holding has created an inconsistency between the
two theories, it will most likely be limited to situations where owner-
ship of the funds changes hands before the escrow is created, as in
Bio-Electronics. Other cases arising in the same way will surely be
very rare. Generally, no buyer in an arm's length transaction would
permit the seller to gain possession of the purchase money prior to the
time when the seller has delivered on his end of the bargain, as Bio-
Electronics apparently did.84 The incentives for the buyer not to relin-
quish control of his funds are self-evident. The lesson of this case
seems to be that it is also in the seller's best interest not to prema-
turely take ownership of the funds, lest he take on the burdens that
come with ownership before he is ready.
In the typical escrow arrangement, where the parties are clear
about their intentions and expectations in using the escrow, they will
be able to safely rely on the ownership theory endorsed by the court in
its holding, and they will obtain the same result as if the agency the-
ory was employed. However, parties must keep in mind the policy
concerns that seem to have influenced the court's decision so they can
avoid actions that would cause them to be labeled the least innocent.
This factor may be the deciding one, regardless of whether or not it is
outwardly expressed.
Leigh M. Koehn
83. Scottsbluff Nat'l Bank v. Blue J. Feeds, Inc., 156 Neb. 65, 83, 54 N.W.2d 392, 403
(1952).
84. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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